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Abstract 
 
 
This study is based on a ten weeks fieldwork in Tunis during the fall of 2013, where I 
interviewed seven organizations working on social development in marginalized areas. 
The thesis examines conditions for social development in Tunisia nearly three years after 
the uprising in 2011, and specifically how different actors perceive themselves and 
others. Combining post-development theory, social movement theory and Fraser’s critical 
theory of justice, the analysis provides an understanding of how these organizations 
frame their work. This in turn leads to a critical discussion on ways of framing 
development with regards to processes of social marginalization and political divisions, 
which form important contexts in which the organizations operate. The central argument 
is that there is a need to consider historical formations of elites in relation to the previous 
regimes’ promotion of secularism in Tunisia, women’s rights and the suppression of 
Islamic activism in order to understand how the organizations operate with regards to 
religion, gender equality, charity and development. The results suggest that despite 
commitments to principles of equality and visions for sustainable development, there are 
risks that some forms of development may contribute to maintaining social and political 
differences in Tunisia.   
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  1 
1 Introduction 
 
 
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Iran continue to use state structures to 
consolidate extremism as the law of the land, and to export these catastrophic models. 
Qatar now joins them in promoting fundamentalists across the regions with its money 
and its media. From the Sahel to the Caucasus, a creeping ‘Islamization’ narrows 
social space, assaults women’s rights, and transfigures lifestyles. (Karima Bennoune, 
2013)
1
 
 
In this quote Bennoune identifies a concern that has been a central part of the public 
discourse since the uprising took place in Tunisia in 2011. The democratization process 
and the opening of the political system revealed a high level of tension between Islamists 
and secularists, something that has played out in public spaces and in media and fueled 
by political assassinations and violent acts. Gray notes that secularists, often represented 
by the opposition to the Islamist government that was in rule from October 2011 to 
January 2014, have expressed concerns that Tunisia is on the road to become an Islamic 
state.
2
 This means a setback for citizens’ individual freedom – especially that of women. 
After the fall of Ben Ali’s regime, new actors have emerged in Tunisia working on 
political, social and economic empowerment. Some of these have a specific focus on 
women’s rights and empowerment of women, claiming gender equality to be their overall 
aim. Other organizations have emerged in response to humanitarian crises in the most 
marginalized areas and have undergone a change from mainly charitable activities to 
social development. These are framing their work not with human rights and gender 
equality, but rather they are claiming to support and empower the family, without 
challenging cultural norms in the communities they work in. This study aims to explore 
differences in the way that organizations present themselves in terms of background and 
                                                 
1
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2
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the current sociopolitical context that surround their work. In order to do so I have 
interviewed seven organizations that work on social development in less privileged areas 
in Tunisia, where three center their work on gender equality and the other four have 
shifted focus from mere charity to what they define as social development. The overall 
aim is to understand how the organizations frame their work, and what this might tell us 
about the contexts they operate in. Al-Ali has argued for viewing women’s organizations 
in Egypt not as isolated groups but rather in terms of coherence between organizations 
and the wider political context they operate in.
3
 I suggest doing the same with the 
organizations that constitute this study, and I will emphasize how social and political 
divisions are reflected in the way they frame their work.  
 
 
1.1 Research questions 
 
The thesis aims to answer these two questions:  
 
1. How do organizations frame their work for social development? 
 
2. How do we contextualize differences in framing with regards to larger social and 
political discourses in Tunisia? 
 
 
1.2 Disposition 
 
In order to provide answers the following work will begin with a chapter providing a 
historical background with emphasis on how the relation between historical discourses on 
secularism and Islamism are related to nation building and formation of elites. Women’s 
rights have been a central issue throughout Tunisia’s history, and rights based 
empowerment of women will be discussed in the literature review in chapter three. Part 
                                                 
3
 Nadje Al-Ali. Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East – The Egyptian Women’s Movement 
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of the literature will provide an understanding of some characteristics of mainstream 
Western discourse and Islamic development discourse. Moreover, this section will 
provide an argument against dualistic thinking in terms of secular-Islamist as a tool for 
analyzing the kind of organizations that appear in this study. Chapter four will explain the 
methodological framework and show that categorization in terms of Islamic/Islamist and 
secular did not turn out as constructive during the interviews and abandoned as limiting 
for the analysis. The theoretical framework that will be presented in chapter five has been 
chosen in order to analyze the organizations in terms of what they do and how they work 
with regards to local and global processes of inclusion and exclusion, and if the 
organizations reflect or challenge these processes. Chapter seven will be based on the 
findings presented in chapter six, which in combination with the literature and theory will 
pose the argument that although the organizations frame their work in different ways, 
there also appear to be similarities between them all. This includes not only the way they 
frame their work, but also how they are involved in processes of social and political 
divisions that work to constitute rather than challenge structures of inequalities in the 
society in which they operate.  
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2 Historical background 
 
 
In 2011 Tunisia became world known as the country where the Arab revolutions started. 
Although the uprising took much of the world by surprise, Tunisia had seen protests over 
social and economic marginalization repeatedly over the last three decades. Academic 
and journalistic works have also contained criticisms of the implementation of economic 
reforms aiming to integrate the country in the global economy, questioning global 
financial institutions’ labeling of Tunisia as an “economic miracle.” In the years that have 
followed the departure of Ben Ali’s regime, attention has been called to the state’s failure 
to provide solutions for deeply rooted regional social and economic disparities. The 
opening of the political system has enabled people to organize in different ways to work 
towards social and economic development in Tunisia’s most disadvantaged areas.  
 
 
2.1 Secularization and elites 
Much of English-language literature on the secular-Islamist division in civil society deals 
with events occurring in the last half of the 20
th
 century, especially with attention to 
women’s rights and changes in the personal status code under the dictatorships of 
Bourghiba and Ben Ali. In order to understand existing tensions between secularists and 
Islamists one should take a look at how secularism evolved in Tunisia prior to the French 
colonization. As Perkins and Brown have noted, in the decades leading up to the invasion 
in 1881 there had already been the start of a process marked by massive borrowing from 
an alien culture. More and more Europeans, mainly French and Italians were settling in 
Tunisia, and Western ways were felt in cheap European goods, architecture, dress and 
habits.
4
 According to Perkins the French education system mainly benefited Europeans 
residing in Tunisia, but also a small part of Tunisians working in the administration of the 
                                                 
4
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protectorate.
 
 However, as Perkins notes, the prevalent cultural hegemony made it 
impossible for Tunisian elites to gain the same status as European settlers, simply 
because they were Arabs.
5
 Perkins also hold that French attempts to include Tunisians 
and especially religious students of the Zeitouna University in the secular, Francophone 
education system was part of a strategy to promote secularism and thus reduce the power 
of the ulama and to prevent the potentially powerful identity of pan-Islamism.
6
  
 
2.2 The state, gender and religion 
Some have described it as a turnabout when Habib Bourghiba and his fellow pan-Islamist 
nationalists achieved independence in 1956 and allowed the state judicial system to 
absorb the sharia courts. Moreover, the regime introduced a Personal Status Code (PSC) 
that granted women a series of rights.
7
 The PSC included the abolishment of polygamy, it 
allowed women to file for divorce, increased the minimum age for marriage, and 
strengthened women’s child custody rights. These changes, according to Keddie, were 
occurring at the time not because of a feminist attitude or as results of a women’s 
movement, but rather as a step to break the power of the ulama and transform the social 
environment in favor of the new government.
8
 Perkins has described how Bourghiba’s 
French-rationalist education was the grounds for his independent ijtihad which aligned 
traditional dress to old-fashioned thinking, condemning the veil as an “odious rag” as 
well as discouraging male traditional dress.
9
 This mentality as well as social programs 
promoting education, modernization and the state control of religious institutions such as 
                                                 
5
 Strinati defines hegemony as: “Dominant groups in society (chiefly but not exclusively the ruling class) 
maintain their dominance by securing the “spontaneous consent” of subordinate groups through the 
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6
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7
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8
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the Zeitouna-mosque, was well received internationally as progress and enlightenment.
10
 
This tendency continued under Zine al-Abidine Ben-Ali’s dictatorship (r. 1987-2011), 
who held up the status of women’s rights as well as portraying Islamists as terrorists who 
would be jailed or exiled.
11
 In spite of the suppression of Arab Muslim identity under 
Bourghiba and Ben Ali, and the following disappearance of Islam from public life, 
religious identity was not eliminated. Rather, the state-enforced French-style laïcité as 
well as the creation of an elitist Francophone education system and the control of 
religious institutions provoked manyTunisians. As Perkins and others have pointed out, 
most Tunisians’ worldview derived from different sources than the sources of Western-
educated elites.
12
  
 
2.3 Structural adjustment of the economy 
According to Perkins, Tunisia’s economy had gone from privileging mainly the European 
settler population and marginalizing Tunisians during the protectorate, to socialist 
tendencies following independence.
13
 However in the 1970s, reforms were made, 
transforming the economy to be liberal and extroverted, based on petroleum and tourism. 
Still, only small, connected elites benefited from the reforms, and most Tunisians 
suffered from declining living standards.
14
 During the 1990s the regime established the 
Tunisian National Solidarity Fund (FSN), which implemented projects concerning 
drinking water, housing, health care and schooling in a number of Tunisia’s most 
marginalized areas. According to Perkins one of the motivations behind the FSN was to 
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deprive Islamic social agencies of the opportunity to do the same.
15
 Perkins also notes 
that the result of the project was a reduction of poverty to the lowest in the Arab world, 
with the exception of the oil-based Gulf-economies. According to the World Bank the 
increase in GDP per capita from 645 TD in 1965 to 2,480 TD in 2005 proves the 
implemented development strategies in Tunisia to be successful.
16
 The World Bank 
especially holds up the empowerment of women to having contributed to an increased 
level of human development in Tunisia.
17
  
Presenting a somewhat different view on the social implications of the World Bank’s 
structural adjustment plans in Tunisia through the 1990s, others have argued that it 
further marginalized a part of the population. King argues that in spite of the national 
economy growing stronger in the 1990s, with more manageable budget deficits and 
external debts, World Bank reforms failed to promote rural equity and rather empowered 
large land owners and excluded Tunisia’s poor from new market arrangements.18 
Therefore the state policies supported by the World Bank instead caused economic 
inefficiency and led to a strengthening of rural landowners, while the rural poor remained 
clientage.  
 
2.4 Divisions in development 
In Tunisia, the Southern regions used to be most resistant to foreign colonization, 
observed through different currents of ideologies like Marxism and Arab nationalism 
before Islamism emerged in the 1970s and evolved into an oppositional force to 
Bourghiba’s and Ben-Ali’s specific nationalist-secularist politics.19 The 1990s also 
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brought new policies in terms of the Barcelona Process and later the ENP, which defined 
the relationship between the EU and its neighbors. The European Neighborhood Policy 
(ENP) is the EU’s official strategy for offering of “a privileged relationship” to 16 of its 
closest neighbors in the Mediterranean.
20
 The common values that are referred to as a 
commitment are: democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market 
economy principles and sustainable development. In lines with the World Bank and the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) gender equality is a cornerstone in 
development, and ending poverty is linked with the full productive employment of 
women outside of the agricultural sector.
21
 Hence development that is funded by UN- and 
EU organs can be viewed as promoting regional integration through a discourse based on 
the values presented above. Since independence, the Northern and coastal areas have 
benefited the most from investments and development, although human rights could not 
serve as a basis as it does today. After 2011 it has become possible for development 
agencies and local organizations to apply religious symbols in their work, which has 
enabled transnational and local NGOs to carry out charity and social development 
projects that openly refer to Islamic values of solidarity with the poor and orphans.
22
 
Some of these were established in the most marginalized areas of the South from where 
they have expanded their activities also to other parts of the country, including urban 
disadvantaged areas of Tunis.  
One of the large global charity providers is Qatar Charity, an NGO that started to operate 
in Tunisia after 2011. It represents a development discourse centered on “family, women 
and children; education and culture; productive projects and investment and waaqf.”23 
                                                 
20
 “European Neighborhood Policy,” accessed May 13, 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-
us/index_en.htm. 
21
 “The gender dimension of the Millennium Development Goals Report 2013,” last modified July 1, 2013, 
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23
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Qatari establishment from which it receives financial and logistical support in order to help poor families 
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The motivations behind Qatar’s involvement in Tunisia have been subject to attention 
and public debate with suspicious overtones.
24
 Still, there is not much academic research 
on the motives behind Qatari and other Gulf countries involvement in Tunisia, but Khatib 
and Roberts are among those holding that rather than exporting ideology Qatar’s 
increased international profile is part of a strategy to protect itself from the danger of 
being a small state among powerful neighbors.
25
 A question that arises is whether one 
neighborhood policy is more political or carrying stronger ideological sentiments than the 
other, however this could be a topic for research in a future study.  
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3 Literature review 
 
 
The following literature has been selected to facilitate a discussion on women’s rights as 
a main framework for development, with emphasis on Muslim majority countries. 
Empowerment of women as part of development discourse has been discussed by many 
academics that have pointed out potential challenges in terms of conflicting interests and 
structures of power. This chapter intends to contribute to an understanding of whether 
women’s rights and empowerment can also be produced in different contexts and without 
necessarily being framed in a language of human rights. Moreover, what will be brought 
to issue is whether categories like secular and Islamic/ist are appropriate tools for 
analyzing these discourses on development.   
 
 
3.1 Rights-based empowerment of women 
 
One word which is widely applied in development discourse and that indicates positive 
change is “empowerment.” However, the term has been described by Parpart, Rai and 
Staudt as a concept that “tends to underplay or ignore the impact of global and national 
forces on prospects for poor people’s (especially women’s) empowerment.”26 The 
authors note that while first being introduced by NGOs in the 1980s as a reaction to top-
down policies with agreements between governments and with the intention of 
challenging existing power structures, “empowerment” entered mainstream development 
discourse in the 1990s.
27
 Tadros defines four categories of women’s empowerment 
projects in the Middle East, based on division of power.
28
 These are: 
                                                 
26
 Jane L. Parpart, Shirin M. Rai, and Kathleen Staudt. “Rethinking em(power)ment, gender and 
development: an introduction.” In Rethinking Empowerment – Gender and development in a global/local 
world, ed. Jane L. Parpart, Shirin M. Rai and Kathleen Staudt (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 
2002), 3. 
27
 Parpart, Rai, Staudt, ”Rethinking em(power)ment,” 10. 
28
 Mariz Tadros. “Between the Elusive and the Illusionary: Donors’ Empowerment Agendas in the Middle 
East Perspective.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 30 (2010), 227-228. 
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 “Power to”  
 “Power within” 
 “Power over” 
 “Power with” 
According to Tadros the first category involves capacity building, leadership promotion 
and gender mainstreaming, while the second promotes self-esteem and psychological 
support through education for girls and training for women.
29
 She argues that most 
projects falls in the category of “power to” and “power within.” The third and fourth 
categories; “power over” and “power with”, are defined respectively by conflict and 
direct confrontation between powerful and powerless interest groups, and the active 
promotion of social mobilization and building alliances and coalitions. Tadros notes that 
the two first categories are the ones that receive donor support, while the two last receive 
no or minimal support from donors. Although not applying the exact same categories, 
Parpart, Rai and Staudt also argue that women’s empowerment discourse has failed to 
offer women power over official institutions or power to demand fundamental change 
through collective political action.
30
 An important point, which both Tadros and Abu-
Lughod have made through analyzing the work of the National Council for Women 
(NCW) in Egypt, is that women’s movements do not necessarily pose a threat to political, 
economic and social foundations of authoritarian regimes.
31
 One example of how 
women’s rights can be viewed as separate from political circumstances is Abu-Lughod’s 
account of a campaign against sexual harassment on the streets in Egypt during the 
Mubarak-regime. The campaign only focused on anonymous harassment and did not deal 
with sexual harassment as part of the security forces attacks on female protesters.
32
  
 
                                                 
29
 Tadros, “Between the Elusive,” 228. 
30
 Parpart, Rai, Staudt, ”Rethinking em(power)ment,” 6-8.  
31
 Tadros, “Between the Elusive,” 28. Abu-Lughod, “The Active Life of ‘Muslim Women’s Rights’: A Plea 
for Ethnography, Not Polemic, with Cases from Egypt and Palestine.” Journal of Middle East Women’s 
Studies, 6 (2010):,” 5-6.  
32
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In order to avoid asking simplistic questions of whether Muslim women have rights or 
not, which will not grasp the complexities of how rights are produced and affected by 
governments, religious institutions and the corporate world, Abu-Lughod argues for 
ethnographic studies of women’s rights as they are mediated and transformed in various 
social contexts, or “social worlds” as she has named it.33 The active life of “Muslim 
women’s rights”, Abu-Lughod holds, can best be understood through how they are 
shaped and perceived in different social and political contexts, including their travel 
through networks and institutions.
34
 According to this view, women’s rights are also 
produced in relation to Islamic law and interpretations of it, and can hardly be viewed 
objectively as something static that exists in opposition to sharia and Islamic political 
parties. Neither should it be taken for granted that rights-based empowerment projects are 
necessarily responsive to social and political circumstances in communities in which they 
are implemented.  
 
 
3.2 Women’s rights in a wider political context 
 
Sardar Ali has argued that CEDAW is based on a predominantly Western liberal feminist 
discourse “that insists on individual rights of woman to the exclusion of the multiplicity 
of her identities.”35 Moreover, she notes that critiques of CEDAW include a 
problematization of conflicting human rights principles such as gender equality on the 
one hand and the right to freedom of religion and custom on the other.
36
 Sardar Ali 
argues that the failure of CEDAW, and also Islamic declarations such as Cairo 
Declaration of Human Rights, is that women’s rights are on the lower rungs in a 
                                                 
33
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34
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35
 “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women” accessed May 13, 
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development in a global/local world, ed. Parpart, Rai and Staudt,(London: Routledge Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2002), 64. 
36
 Sardar Ali, “Women’s rights,” 64-65. 
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hierarchy of rights.
37
 Neither do any of these declarations suggest a methodology to 
provide a solution to the problem of conflicting rights, she argues. Another critique 
directed towards women’s rights as part of development discourse is what Abu-Lughod 
and Hasso perceive as a double discourse observed in the Arab Human Development 
Report of 2005, which they both argue on the one hand promotes women’s rights and 
freedom, and on the other hand sets the conditions and limitations for the ones they claim 
to support.
38
 Abu-Lughod argues that the internationalization of women’s rights needs to 
be framed in such a way that it does not “become grounds for arguments about the ‘clash 
of civilizations’ and their associated political, economic and military agendas.”39 In her 
criticism of the same report Hasso also expresses concern over discourses that facilitate 
militarized and humanitarian interventions rather than encourage fundamental 
improvements in most women’s lives. Moreover, Hasso argues that the ADHR is situated 
within a neoliberal human development framework, and that it reinforces rather than 
challenges Arab state power.
40
 She problematizes the “global women’s rights” discourse 
in the sense that women are constituted as a global category, and that the global women’s 
rights discourse are “part and parcel of transnational feminist governmentalities, which 
manage, normalize, and even constitute a range of inequalities among women.”41 This is 
what Mohanty stresses when she criticizes Western feminist scholarship for assuming 
non-Western women to be a homogenous group, bound together by oppression. Mohanty 
holds that transnational feminism needs to be “attentive to micro-politics of context, 
subjectivity and struggle, as well as macro-politics of global and political systems and 
                                                 
37
 Sardar Ali, “Women’s rights,” 70-71. “Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.” Accessed May 11, 
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38
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39
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40
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41
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processes.”42 The global women’s rights discourse has been formulated by Sayigh as part 
of “a polemic against Islam” and “an obsession with Arab women as a topic of 
international concern and research.”43 In the case of Palestinian camps in Lebanon, 
Sayigh claims that it is a political choice of the UN and the international community that 
NGOs in the camps spend large sums of money on projects concerning women and less 
on other issues that need attention, such as poverty, child labor, corruption and 
colonialism. These critical perspectives all highlight a need for increased awareness of 
oppression on several levels, and form a background for exploring how gender tend to be 
central in discourses that are based on an idea of a clash of civilizations .  
 
 
3.3 Modernity versus traditions 
 
Norris and Inglehart have claimed that “the most basic cultural fault line between the 
West and Islam does not concern democracy – it involves issues of gender equality and 
sexual liberation.”44 Bahi shows how the authors she refers to represent a view that 
human development and modernization generate systematic, predictable changes in 
culture, and in specific gender roles in any society. According to this logic 
industrialization will bring education for women, and consequently a reduction of fertility 
rates and increased participation of women in government.
45
 Then, during a postindustrial 
phase, women will gain more power through moving into higher positions in 
management as well as in political life. Bahi notes that women are often in the focus of 
conflicting and ambiguous interests with regards to the state, international agendas, and 
heterogeneity, which brings to question cultural and religious identity.
46
 In the Tunisian 
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context, both Zeghal and Gray hold that women are in the center of the debate on 
different conceptions of living.
47
 Zeghal argues that the Islamist and secular camps have 
been and still are mostly concerned with conceptions of freedom and ways of living 
rather than with notions of the “pro-Islamic” state and the “pro-democratic” secular 
state.
48
  
 
The political divisions observed in Tunisia today need to be seen in relation to the history 
of government suppression of Islamists and promotion of state feminism. Gray points out 
that there is a fear among secularists and feminists that if Al-Nahdha is in power they will 
change the Personal Status Code (PSC) and that the future will see new conservative laws 
based on sharia.
49
 This is an important point with relevance to the World Bank’s claim 
that the Tunisian state’s gender reforms have been a cornerstone for economic progress in 
the past, a claim that ignores the complexities involved in this process, including what 
Abu-Lughod would describe as the governmentalization of rights.
50
  
 
Charrad has explored the relation between the Tunisian state and gender policy through 
history and finds that shifts in Tunisian state policy on women’s rights has been a result 
of social and political groups contesting over state power. She argues that  
…shifts in state policy from the 1930s to the 1990s had in common the fact that 
they had less to do with varying degrees of commitment to Islam or feminism on 
the part of the leadership, and much more to do with the political struggles for 
state power dominating the national scene at any given historical moment.
51
  
Kandiyoti has also pointed out that the expansion of women’s citizenship rights in Arab 
countries is related to secularism as part of nation-state building. She holds up what has 
happened in e.g. India and Pakistan when such state projects have failed: 
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As religious and ethnic identities become increasingly politicized, they tend to 
sacrifice women's hard-won civil rights on the altar of a politics of identity that 
prioritizes control of women. Governments struggling to shore up their legitimacy 
may choose tactically to relinquish control of women to their immediate 
communities and families, thus depriving female citizens of full legal protection.
52
  
 
Moreover, Kandiyoti points to Bangladesh as an example of how the government 
attempted to balance gender ideologies implicit in conflicting development projects.
53
 In 
this case the US funded projects aimed to empower women through participation in the 
labor market, while aid from wealthy Muslim countries, i.e. Saudi Arabia strengthened 
religious education that promoted more control over women. According to Kandiyoti this 
might also be observed in other countries where conservative ideologies are increasing 
and where women are harnessed by funding agencies in order to fulfill the visions of 
modernity and economic development.
54
 These perspectives suggest that dichotomies like 
secularist/modernist and Islamist/traditionalist might be strengthened by the idea of 
confrontation between Islam and “the West”, where women tend to be important markers.  
 
 
3.4 Challenging dualistic thinking 
 
Abu-Lughod has argued for a more nuanced understanding of Islamism and secularism in 
Egypt. Through an analysis of popular culture she shows that ideas of marriage, the 
nuclear family, the woman’s role as the caretaker of the family and the value of love in 
marriage is generally found to overlap in secular and Islamist discourse. She holds that 
although Islamists are often assumed to be more traditional than so called progressives, 
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this is not always the case.
55
 The categorization of Islamists has also been discussed by 
Schewedler, who highlights a tendency in scholarship on political Islam to view 
moderates as supporting liberal democratic reforms, while radicals do not.
56
 She argues 
that instead of focusing only on Islamist groups in order to categorize them on 
background of whether they express democratic commitments or not, there is a need to 
focus on other local and global political actors in order to understand more of the context 
in which they act.
57
 Hafez’s ethnographic study of Islamic activist women in Egypt 
provides an example of how the dualistic thinking of “secular” and “religious” can be 
challenged.
58
 According to Hafez the women in her study understood religion not as “al-
din wa al-dawla” (religion and state), but rather as something private.59 Hafez’s study 
shows that the women are implementing a set of secular agendas along with Islamic 
ideals, such as viewing religion as a private category more than a public affair. Hence 
notions of womanhood, activism and religion are discursively produced.  
 
Tadros in fact suggest that we should abandon terms such as “religious” vs. “secular”, 
“moderate Islamist” vs. “radical Islamist”, “feminist” vs. “Muslim activist” on an 
analytical level, on the grounds that such binaries do not necessarily describe people’s 
agency in different contexts.
60
 Like Tadros, Al-Ali problematizes the “modern-
traditional” and “western-indigenous” dichotomizations, which in her view is 
representing a rigid East-West divide.
61
 She holds up findings from her ethnographic 
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research in Egypt which shows that the gender training packages provided by Western 
organizations is often based on Western feminism and its problems and not considering 
the specific context and history of Egyptian feminist struggles.
62
 This relates to what has 
been problematized by Hasso and others; that if global women’s rights discourses exist 
within a neoliberal human development framework and local struggles are not taken into 
consideration, in the end inequalities might be reconstituted.  
 
 
3.5 Charity and social development 
 
Ibrahim has accounted for what she argues is a change in Arab philanthropy in Egypt, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Lebanon, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. Based on field 
studies from the different countries Ibrahim claims that there has been a shift from an old, 
stagnant practice of charitable giving towards projects aiming for more sustainable 
change.
63
 Her findings show that although with long traditions, charity as a concept is 
dynamic and can be strategic and effective in addressing underlying causes of social 
problems. Ibrahim defines charitable giving as “contributions to causes that alleviate the 
immediate suffering or wants of people in need” and which is commonly known as 
“zakat.”64 Zakat is the third pillar of Islam and requires Muslims to give a portion of their 
wealth in order to help the poor and thus provide social stability. Ibrahim underlines the 
difference between zakat and sadaqa, explaining that since sadaqa is less structured, “it 
recently has been explored as a way to extend Muslim civil society organizations’ work 
to more development-oriented approaches and support for art, culture, or environmental 
protection.”65 Thus charity can also include voluntary work and free services, as well as 
being used to mobilize funds for economic development projects in poor areas. In her 
study of four transnational Muslim NGOs, Juul Petersen has found that the two UK based 
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organizations; Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid represent a different ideology and 
conception of aid and Islam than the two Gulf-based NGOs, Islamic Relief Organization 
and International Islamic Charitable Organization.
66
 In line with what Ibrahim has found, 
Juul Petersen argues that the former two organizations have developed from only 
implementing religiously oriented projects such as Qarbani sacrifices, Ramadan meals 
and orphan sponsorships to more of a secularized development strategy focused on 
sustainability.
67
 This she defines as a secularized form of aid. While studying these 
organizations, Juul Petersen has found that there is not necessarily something 
extraordinarily Islamic about those that have a charity profile besides being humanitarian 
and development oriented.
68
 The two latter NGOs on the other hand, have a vision that is 
based on religion, and they work to promote an Islamic culture rather than a development 
culture, representing a “sacralized form of aid.”69 These studies pose an argument against 
viewing Islamic charities as essentially different from development organizations that 
define themselves as secular.  
 
 
3.6 “Faith based organizations” 
 
In her doctoral thesis on transnational Muslim NGOs, Juul Petersen has found that there 
are two tendencies in how these organizations are presented in development literature. 
Either they are viewed as “fronts for political, sometimes terrorist organizations” or as 
“faith-based organizations, seeing them as effective tools in the implementation of 
development projects.”70 Jones and Juul Petersen argue that the structural adjustment 
plans that were carried out in developing countries during the 1980s and 1990s in general 
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led to an opening of developing space, and where actors in development began to 
introduce policies applying concepts such as “human development”, “social capital” 
and “participation.” The authors explain what they call a “religious turn” in development 
with the fact that religion did not disappear – in lines with what Berger has accounted for 
as the “desecularization of the world” – as well as international security measures after 
9/11 that has led to an increased interest in Islamic activism and organizations.
71
 
According to Jones and Juul Petersen recent development literature has defined a certain 
type of NGOs as “Faith Based Organizations” (FBOs) and emphasized strengths and 
qualities that secular organizations do not have: 
Religion and religious organizations are seen as relevant and useful tools in 
carrying out development work, capable of facilitating processes of development 
based on organizational features such as their historical rootedness, popular 
legitimacy, infrastructure, networks and motivation.
72
  
Hence local knowledge and religion as a motivating force for people’s trust and 
recruitment of volunteers makes FBOs potential tools in the implementation of 
development projects and distribution of aid. This is in lines with what others having 
claimed is an invention in development policy for overcoming what has been perceived 
as the obstacle of religion.
73
 Juul Petersen argues that a problem with such an 
instrumental understanding of these organizations is that:  
this perspective invites an ahistorical focus on current organisations and their 
activities, particularly those whose activities potentially complement mainstream 
aid. As a result, perhaps unintentionally, the literature on transnational Muslim 
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NGOs often presents them as a rather static and homogeneous group of 
organisations.
74
  
Tadros has also expressed a concern with this growing trend in incorporating religion and 
involving religious authorities in development projects, and she notes how religion can be 
viewed as an instrument to promote human rights: 
…religion has also become an important entry point in development policy and 
practice in the light of the entrenchment of neoliberal policies and the rise of 
identity politics. Faith-based actors have been brought to centre stage as providers 
of welfare services, mediators of social change and as arbitrators in administering 
justice. Some Western donors have also espoused an agenda of engaging with 
Muslim leaders while adopting a religious framework for advancing human rights 
in ‘Muslim communities’.75  
 
Although Tadros is critical to an instrumental approach to religion, she is emphasizing 
that religion should not be ignored as a potential important mobilizing force.
76
 However, 
it would be wrong to view religion as the only approach to community engagement since 
people can have multiple identities and capacities besides religion. Juul Petersen notes 
that while studies of local and transnational Muslim NGOs can contribute to a better 
understanding of the popular mobilization of Islamic groups such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Hamas and Hezbollah, there is also a need for more academic research that 
aim to go beyond the religious appearance and explore the heterogeneity and changing 
nature of the organizations.
77
 What Juul Petersen and Tadros argue can be related to how 
development strategies aim to change cultural norms in order to promote gender equality. 
If development is based on a dualistic thinking in terms of conceptions like traditional 
versus modern or Islamic versus secular, rights or no rights, then this assumes some 
essential differences between groups of people or organizations that might not be the 
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case. An openness to go beyond appearances is a necessary step towards exploring how 
discourses are produced.  
 
 
3.7 Summary  
 
This chapter has focused on literature that highlights how a promotion of women’s rights 
does not necessarily challenge oppressive states and global structures. It has been 
suggested by some of the authors that a sole focus on gender in development could lead 
to ignoring other problems that cause social marginalization and oppression. The main 
conclusion here is the importance of context. Women’s rights are discursively produced, 
not only in NGOs or in terms of human rights, but in relation to religious institutions, 
governments, and in the different social worlds where people’s realities are constructed. 
Based on the literature one could also suggest that the way that governments’ politics of 
secularism and Islamism, where women tend to be important markers, is an important 
part of the context in which discourses on development emerge and unfold. 
Understanding these realities in terms of oppositional binaries like Islamic-secular and 
progressive-traditional might limit our ability to go beyond appearance and to see how 
individuals and organizations respond to the contexts they operate in.  
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4 Methods 
 
 
In the beginning the idea for this study was to explore meanings of divisions along 
secular and religious lines in Tunisian civil society after the revolution started in 2011. 
However, it turned out to be a long process to find a scope through which to perform the 
study. In the following I will emphasize the role of meetings with people representing 
different parts of Tunisian civil society and the availability of organizations in the process 
of recruiting research partners. The participants will be briefly introduced before methods 
of data collection and transcription and analysis will be discussed. Finally, there will be a 
section on ethical considerations that were raised during the research cycle, with special 
attention to issues of categorization.  
 
 
4.1 Selection of participants 
 
From the beginning a qualitative approach was chosen. According to Hennink, Hutter and 
Bailey qualitative research is “useful for exploring new topics or understanding complex 
issues; for explaining people’s beliefs and behavior; and for identifying the social and 
cultural norms of a culture or society.”78 The methods of in depth interviews and 
participatory observation seemed to be suitable since I aimed to establish more of an 
anthropological study of an organization. Using elements of ethnographic methods was 
thought to center the study on motivations and construction of identity for 
volunteers/activists in one or two organizations that defined themselves as Islamic. 
However, as it turned out I was not able to gain that sort of access to organizations. What 
was thought to be the first meeting in a series of interviews and observations was in many 
cases the only one achieved. Some organizations were discovered through other 
organizations, in lines with what Hennink Hutter and Bailey names “the snowball-
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method,” however this method did not accumulate as many new contacts as desired.79 
The choice of participants in this study largely depended on information obtained from 
internet searches and journalists who were interested in social development. It often 
turned out to be more difficult than expected to get appointments within a time 
reasonable with regards to my three months’ time frame. Even in cases where I already 
had an appointment, plans changed due to offices being closed for holidays, cancellations 
of appointments or finally obtaining an appointment in the last month of my stay in 
Tunisia. Thus selection of organizations was to a large extent depending on the 
organizations’ willingness to meet, and often methods for collecting information had to 
be adjusted to the character of the meeting once it occurred. It turned out that visiting 
organizations without an appointment was the most effective, even if this also resulted in 
a rejection in some cases.  
 
To three of the interviews I was accompanied by a journalist that I had established 
contact with when I arrived in Tunisia. We agreed that I would do the interviews based 
on my interests, and that his function would be to translate where necessary since he 
spoke Tunisian Arabic fluently. It turned out that the journalist functioned as a gate 
opener. Firstly, his language skills enabled him to convince the organizations about 
giving us some time. Although he was Italian of origin, he had been residing in Tunisia 
for a decade and appeared well accustomed to communication and language. Also, 
because he was a male journalist and some years older than myself, I had a feeling that he 
gained more respect than me as an English speaking female student. Although the 
purpose was always to plan and select participants in a non-randomly way, as Hennink, 
Hutter and Bailey have argued to be necessary in order to ensure diversity and 
justification for the research topic, the selected participants should not be considered to 
represent a full picture of organizations involved in social development.
80
 Still, as will be 
shown in the following the participants do have some common factors that make them 
suitable for a case study of contemporary ways of framing development in Tunisia. 
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4.2 Introduction of the participants 
 
There are seven organizations included in this study, whereof four are local organizations 
that emerged after 2011. The three last ones are all Tunis-based organizations that have a 
special focus on gender equality. The organizations are: 
 
 Wattaniyya Charity: Has a clear charity aspect in its work, focusing on supporting 
poor people with basic resources such as school equipment, water and technical 
equipment. It also runs special campaigns in Ramadan, providing food and gifts 
for the poor. 
 Baraka: Founded in Germany several years ago, but appears only to work in 
Tunisia. In addition to campaigns similar to Wattaniyya Charity, Baraka aims to 
contribute to social development through supporting small businesses in rural 
areas. According to information material they do this in close cooperation with 
Qatar Charity.  
 Tunisian Committee for Coordination of Charity (TCCC): Functions as a 
coordinator for other charity organizations, as well as providing its own trainings 
for volunteers. They distribute resources as well as encourage and support local 
businesses.  
 Hope for Tomorrow: Operates only in one neighborhood in Tunis, where it 
functions as a resource center for orphans. Moreover, they are involved in 
renovations of homes and supporting small businesses in the neighborhood.  
 Center for Gender in Development (CGD): Since its establishment in Tunisia in 
1993 the organization has been producing research and contributed to smaller 
development projects in rural areas, mainly helping to start and support women’s 
business projects through training and financing.  
 Association for Social Inclusion in Tunisia (ASIT): Supports local businesses 
through provision of training and resources. Has since 2005 been aiming to 
economically empower women through micro-finance projects in the Tunis 
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neighborhood where it holds office. After 2011 it has expanded its activities and 
become more outspoken about human rights and specifically women’s rights.  
 Creating the Future: Has its main office in Jordan and started working in Tunisia 
in 2011. Provides technical and financial support to initiatives of civil society 
organizations on the areas of democracy, human rights and good governance.  
In addition I have included the branch office of a larger, transnational organization that 
was established in Tunisia in 2012, namely Qatar Charity. This organization will be 
viewed in terms of its partnership with several of the organizations rather than being 
treated as a distinctive participant. The organization is included mainly because it turned 
out to bring some strong connotations among some of the participants in this study, 
something I consider relevant with regards to the organizations perceptions of each other. 
 
 
4.3 The interviews 
 
Before going to the first organization I had a list of questions that I had formed based on 
informal conversations with new acquaintances in Tunis; academics as well as news 
stories, political analysis and academic writings. On all occasions I would be invited into 
an office or another room where I would sit down with the director. I would introduce 
myself as a student from Center for Middle Eastern Studies in Lund, Sweden, and that I 
was doing a study on organizations in Tunisia with specific focus on charity. On the 
occasions where the journalist was with me, he introduced himself as a journalist living 
in Tunisia, and that he was there out of a journalistic interest as well as for translation. I 
made it clear that the results would be used for my thesis and that the participants would 
be anonymous according to the university’s guidelines. Either in the beginning or in the 
end I also asked for permission to use the information and to quote them in a journalistic 
article on charity organizations, which I got the permission to do. I would begin by 
asking about the background of the organization; how it started, the size of the 
organization and what their visions are. The list of questions included working methods, 
with whom they work and which partners they cooperate with and examples of the 
process of a project. If it felt appropriate I would ask if they were politically or 
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religiously affiliated, but in some cases I felt that the humanitarian aspect had gotten so 
much emphasis by the interviewees that it almost felt provocative to ask this. However, if 
natural, I would ask in the end of the interviews if they agreed on the assumption that 
there is a new Islamic civil society emerging in Tunisia, without asking directly if they 
felt like a part of that. Another topic that I felt was potentially sensitive was the funding. 
This derived from an email correspondence with a Tunisian development expert who 
claimed that charity organizations are less transparent when it comes to their funding than 
what secular organizations tend to be. Therefore I would try to hang the question of 
funding and donors on something related to that in their answers; as an apropos. For 
example, they would show me a video or pictures from a project they had done, and I 
would comment that it looked costly and thus ask how they could finance it. The course 
of the conversation made it necessary to shuffle the questions I had prepared both since 
some answers covered several questions and other questions were raised during the 
conversation. In lines with what Clark has described, my experience was that semi-
structured interviews in many cases increased the sense of rapport and trust and made the 
conversation more spontaneous and genuine than if I would have followed the list of 
questions.
81
   
 
 
4.4 Aiming for the insiders’ perspective 
 
During the interviews I asked if it was possible to meet with some of their volunteers, 
intending to understand what motivated them in their work. I got the chance to meet with 
volunteers of two organizations. After the first interview with Wattaniyya Charity, and 
continued attempts to get in touch with more of their volunteers in the southern part of 
the country, the director invited me to come by and observe an activity that included 
packing and distribution of meat to a number of poor families in the Medeneen area in the 
South. There I had a dialogue with some of the volunteers about their motivation for their 
involvement. However, since people were busy working it was not possible to conduct 
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any interviews that day. Back in Tunis I obtained the contact information to one of 
Wattaniyya Charity’s office assistants, and when we met it turned out that she also was a 
volunteer and had been requested by the director to do an interview with me. Another two 
assistants joined in, and I got the chance to ask them all some questions about their 
volunteering. Their answers were short, and my attempts to ask follow-up questions and 
to probe mostly resulted in only one sentence. In the end I asked if they knew some other 
volunteers I could meet with, and they said they would try to arrange it. However, I got 
no response when I reminded them per email. The other organization where I 
successfully arranged a meeting with volunteers was Hope for Tomorrow. The first time I 
went there I was prepared to meet with the director and one volunteer, but upon arrival it 
turned out I was meeting with the director, three volunteers and one neuropsychologist. 
Thus I got the chance to do a spontaneous interview with a whole team of people 
involved, and it turned out that this interview proceeded much easier than the previous 
group interview. I returned to Hope for Tomorrow a second time, where I attended an 
English class and got the chance to talk to the children that participated as well as one of 
the parents. In the very end of my stay two volunteers took me to see a house in the 
neighborhood that the organization was helping to renovate. 
 
 
4.5 Analyzing and transcribing interviews 
 
Out of the in total 9 interviews that constitute the core of this study, whereof two are from 
the second meeting with two organizations, six are recorded and transcribed. During the 
remaining four, notes were taken carefully throughout the interviews, noting nearly 
verbatim what was being said by the interviewees or the translator. Whether the 
interviews were recorded or not depended on how planned and arranged the interview 
was. It felt less comfortable to ask for permission to record in the cases where I had 
obtained a spontaneous appointment, since the participants were not prepared for the 
interview. In the cases of recorded interviews, these were transcribed without the use of a 
transcription program. The transcription included every word said as well as all sounds 
effects, interruptions and pauses. However, for the purpose of making reading easier all 
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citations used in the thesis have been edited into coherent sentences. Such editing has 
only been done when the message appears clear and the content is not affected as a result. 
When something has been removed in between two relevant statements occurring in the 
same answer to a question, this is marked by a […].When the notes and transcriptions 
were ready, the texts were scanned for themes that occurred in all the interviews. A mix 
of inductive and deductive coding was applied. Some topics could be recognized in the 
interview guide, such as background and mission of the organizations. Other topics were 
singled out as reflecting what was important to the interviewees, such as how the 
different representatives for organizations related to categories like Islamism and charity. 
The themes were first identified to be: background of organization, organizational 
structure, self-presentation, gender aspect in projects, and their view of how Islamic and 
human rights based development differ. While writing up the findings, the themes were 
reduced into “structure and mission”, “self-presentation and view of others” and “aspects 
of charity and development”, as this turned out to cover the common themes.  
 
 
4.6 Ethical considerations and concerns 
 
What became increasingly apparent throughout the research process was the importance 
of choice of terms. The representatives of CGD, ASIT and Creating the Future generally 
seemed used to talking to students and had much to say about their mission and strategies 
as well as their views on charities. Since the interviews with these organizations occurred 
rather late in the study when I had already centered my attention on what I perceived as 
charities, the conversations tended to turn towards what in the interviews would be 
named Islamic organizations. However, it should be emphasized that it was me who 
brought up the mention of “Islamic” or “charities”, and not that the organizations 
presented themselves in relation to these. In fact none of them seemed to consider 
charities as doing anything similar to themselves, and the term “Islamic” tended to be 
converted to “Islamist” by the interviewees – a term often applied in public discourse as 
contradictory to secularism and human rights. Given the strong opinions some of the 
participants turned out to have, and the dichotomization of secularists and Islamists in 
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Tunisia, I ended up reconsidering the use of “Islamic” throughout the interviews. Only 
because I perceived them as Islamic, it was not necessarily what characterized them the 
most. Also, even if it would have been right to label them Islamic or Islamist, there is a 
wide difference between all Tunisian Islamists; their members come from very different 
backgrounds and ideologies are formed in different contexts.
82
 In an environment which 
is already marked by fear and mistrust, terms and conceptions could probably have an 
effect on people’s attitude towards each other. I have deliberately avoided labeling some 
of the organizations “secular” because I would like to avoid the Islamic-secular 
dichotomization all together in my analysis. In this study I would rather show how 
differences in the organizations’ strategies might function to align them with a certain 
side rather than assuming that secular and Islamic are natural categories that define them 
as fundamentally different in nature. When terms such as “European organizations” or 
“Islamic” appeared during some interviews, this was mostly a matter of easing 
conversations according to language skills, and can be referred to as what Hennink, 
Hutter and Bailey describes as translation of research questions into a more “colloquial 
language.”83 Finally, based on my experience that some of the issues in the interviews are 
sensitive for the participants, and in order to better conceal participants’ identities for the 
sake of anonymity, I have decided to change the names of all organizations and 
volunteers that participate in this study. 
 
 
4.7 Limitations 
 
From the very beginning of the research cycle it was obvious that my lack of sufficient 
skills in Arabic and French was a serious limitation. First of all it means that my insight 
in existing literature on the topic is limited to what is written in English, when much of 
what is written about Tunisia and North Africa is in French and Arabic. When it comes to 
selection of participants, the way they were selected would have been easier to apply if I 
had sufficient knowledge of French or Arabic to carry out interviews in one of these 
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languages. Clark has remarked that many researchers experience more confidence if a 
local research assistant is involved in meetings with participants.
84
 In this study it would 
probably have been an advantage to hire a Tunisian translator who could participate both 
in the recruitment process and translate during interviews, but this was difficult to arrange 
because of budget limitations and because it was not possible to schedule many of the 
interviews. In the two interviews where the journalist translated, it has to be considered 
that he is not a native Arabic speaker and thus is there an increased risk that some content 
has been lost in translation. On the other hand, it was probably an advantage that we had 
a common interest in the topics raised in the interviews, which meant he could 
understand my intentions and thus formulate my questions in an appropriate way. Finally, 
the timeframe of this study turned out to be too short considering the time consuming 
process of recruiting participants. The problem that I experienced has been pointed out by 
Wiktorowicz, who points out that it can take time to build trust and familiarity with 
members of movements where networks are opaque for research.
85
 In accordance with 
what Wiktorowicz notes, I found it difficult to obtain sufficient information about the 
function of networks and alliances through organizational charts and secondary material.  
 
 
4.8 Summary 
 
In this chapter I have discussed reasons for why the study has been shaped the way it has, 
and the different factors that affected the choice of participants. Overall the participants 
were chosen on basis of a combination of their availability and strategic planning. The 
selection has been affected by limitations in language and challenges related to 
appointments; however a part of the process was eased considerably by a journalist who 
functioned as a gate opener. Participatory observation and in depth interviews were found 
to be inadequately appropriate methods for the interview situations that occurred. Overall 
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the information achieved was mostly about the organizations as presented by their official 
representatives. The common themes can be categorized as the organization’s mission, 
view of themselves and others, aspects of charity and development, as well as some 
examples of how volunteers were motivated in their work. In conclusion, although there 
have been some challenges that limited the preferred diversity of participants and more of 
an in depth perspective, what has resulted is an explorative work on the nature of the 
research topic. 
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5 Theoretical framework 
 
 
The following will provide a theoretical framework for the interpretation of different 
forms of social development. As we have seen, organizations can frame their work for 
development differently although their overall aim is to bring increased welfare for 
people that are exposed to poverty and social marginalization. This aim can also be 
understood as an attempt to increase people’s ability to participate as citizens, and can be 
accounted for in terms of Fraser’s three dimensions of justice. Although this study is not 
explicitly concerned with analyzing the concept of justice, Fraser’s discussion provides a 
useful tool that can be used to explore and situate different approaches to development 
that goes beyond descriptive terms such as “sustainability”, “empowerment” and other 
“buzzwords.” In order to analyze processes involved in development, elements of social 
movement theory will be applied together with a post-development perspective, which 
will in turn enable us to further contextualize different ways of framing.  
 
 
5.1 A three dimensional justice 
 
Fraser defines justice as “parity of participation” and which “requires social arrangements 
that permit all to participate as peers in social life.”86 She identifies three dimensions that 
impede people from full participation, and which must be inherent in theories of justice. 
The first is maldistribution, which is about economic structures that deny some people the 
ability to interact with others as equals.
87
 This is about class structure of society, which 
privileges some over others and is of economic character. Maldistribution may include 
unequal income and wealth, access to food, water and other resources, as well as access 
to the labor market and education. The second dimension of injustice is misrecognition, 
which equals status inequality.
88
According to Fraser this is about institutional hierarchies 
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of cultural value that hinder interaction between people as peers. One example is gender 
inequality, where women might be disfavored with regards to opportunities for careers 
and influential positions because they are expected to prioritize the family. Another 
example may be the suppression and stigmatization of religious groups, which is likely to 
result in limited opportunities for certain groups to participate as peers in a given society. 
The third dimension of justice has to do with representation, involving who is included 
and excluded in the political community where the recognition and distribution take 
place.
89
 In Fraser words it tells us “not only who can make claims for redistribution and 
recognition, but also how such claims are to be mooted and adjudicated.”90 The challenge 
regarding representation, Fraser claims, is that struggles for justice are often framed in 
ways that dispute the “what” of justice, which can be of material or cultural/legal 
character, while taking for granted that the “who” is the national citizenry and the unit for 
justice the territorial state.
91
 According to Fraser misframing is the sort of 
misrepresentation that defines the age of globalization, and can best be observed in weak 
or failed states that cannot provide its citizens with economic justice, let alone claim the 
rights on behalf of marginalized groups vulnerable to exploitation and changes in the 
global economy.
92
  
 
 
5.2 The state as provider for justice  
 
Fraser explains how the notion of the territorial state as provider for justice is working 
against an understanding of other obstacles that prevent some people from participating 
as peers: 
Channeling their claims into the domestic political spaces of relatively powerless, 
if not wholly failed, states, this frame insulates offshore powers from critique and 
control. Among those shielded from the reach of justice are more powerful 
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predator states and transnational private powers, including foreign investors and 
creditors, international currency speculators, and transnational corporations. Also 
protected are the governance structures of the global economy, which set 
exploitative terms of interaction and then exempt them from democratic control.
93
  
This is in line with Trouillot’s claim that globalization has made it unclear what the state 
and its power really is. In his view, the state can be defined as a set of processes, and the 
state can be experienced through the effects of these processes.
94
 Trouillot also claims 
that the peripheral state is weakened through the processes of globalization, and that 
NGOs and trans- and national institutions have taken the role of producing state effects in 
peripheral societies.
95
 In order to overcome the illusion of the territorial state as providing 
for people’s justice, Fraser argues that a new framing for justice should be post-
Westphalian, which she suggests should follow the “all affected principle”:  
On this view, what turns a collection of people into fellow subjects of justice is  
not geographical proximity, but their co-imbrication in a common structural or 
institutional framework, which sets the ground rules that govern their social 
interaction, thereby shaping their respective life possibilities, in patterns of 
advantage and disadvantage.
96
  
This is not to say that the territorial state is irrelevant, but that states are integrated in the 
global economy in different ways. Fraser argues that there are other structures than only 
the state itself that have an impact on people’s chance to live a good life.97 One 
interpretation of such is that when international institutions impose land reforms and 
other structural changes on national economies, states might end up facilitating the 
workings of such policies rather than protecting the poorest of its citizens. This can be 
explained by applying a post-development perspective.  
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5.3 The trajectory of development  
 
Escobar offers a post-development perspective through which he argues that development 
was invented to serve the interest of Western capitalist paradigms.
98
 He gives an account 
of how poverty on a global scale was a discovery of the post-World War 2 period, and 
that “massive poverty in the modern sense appeared only when the spread of the market 
economy broke down community ties and deprived millions of people from access to 
land, water, and other resources.”99 Development was institutionalized and 
professionalized with the creation of the International bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1944. 
Escobar holds that development evolved into a discourse with the establishment of 
development studies in the social sciences.
100
 As pointed out by Fraser, the ways 
modernization unfolded in and outside Europe was accompanied by a belief that Europe 
and the West was superior to other parts of the world, a critique which can be recognized 
in what Escobar defines as an  
…unquestioned desirability of economic growth (…) which would allow for the 
replication in the poor countries of those conditions characteristic of mature 
capitalist ones (including industrialization, urbanization, agricultural 
modernization, infrastructure, increased provision of social services, and high 
level of literacy.
101
  
 
A discourse, in Foucauldian terms, produces and circulates truth and knowledge about 
social groups. The truth, morality and meaning produced through development discourse 
was based on the idea that poor countries were dependent on capital investments from 
developed countries in order to advance socially, culturally and politically. Theories of 
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development were invented in academia and by experts in fields such as economy, 
education, nutrition and agriculture, viewing the poor as objects to be studied and 
managed. According to Escobar technological and social innovations against poverty 
were invented to prevent social and political unrest as consequence of economic 
underdevelopment in developing countries, and in that way ensure continued prosperity 
for Western countries.102 The poor should be provided with education, health, hygiene and 
morality in order to transform them into consumers. Cornwall has argued that one way to 
introduce new reforms and policies in development is through the use of buzzwords. In 
her view words such as “poverty reduction”, “rights based”, “participation” and even 
“development” itself are buzzwords that suggest good things that people often 
spontaneously agree with.
103
 Cornwall characterizes buzzwords as gaining their power  
…through their vague and euphemistic qualities, their capacity to embrace a 
multitude of possible meanings, and their normative resonance. The work that 
these words do for development is to place the sanctity of its goals beyond 
reproach.
104
  
Cornwall also points out that the words constitute a language which is typically not used 
by the lay person, thus leaving it open what they might mean in practice and suggesting 
that development is better left to experts.
105
 These views indicate that development 
discourse has evolved in response to security and economic needs of donor countries 
more than local needs in communities that are targeted for development. Instead of being 
actors, poor people become objects that are to be transformed according to programs.  
 
 
5.4 NGOization of social movements 
 
Choudry and Kapoor have outlined the evolution of human rights organizations since the 
Cold War, arguing that in general their work have been compatible with the maintenance 
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of existing geopolitical structures of authority and wealth.
106
 After the Cold War the 
focus has been turned to strengthening of civil society and good governance, but that the 
effects have too often been the strengthening of liberalism and undermining of 
democracy.
107
 Choudry and Kapoor claim that instead of contributing to building of 
social movements with a solid grassroots base, professional elites of NGO representatives 
are the ones that are most influenced by international networks.
108
 Processes of 
professionalization are driven by neoliberal policies, and organizations that claim to 
represent the poor and marginalized tend to overshadow and displace mass based 
movements.
109
 These issues have been discussed by Jad, who demonstrates how the 
NGOization of women’s movements have resulted in a depolitization of women’s 
movements in Palestine and in other Arab countries.
110
 Jad argues that this includes a 
process of professionalization, and that many NGOs are top-down and lack democracy 
within the organizations.
111
 Moreover, there is a lack of constituency because projects are 
often short-lived and the organizations are not based on a broad involvement of local 
people. This adds to the perspectives of Escobar, Choudry and Kapoor that suggest a 
tendency that development programs on poverty reduction are serving elites rather than 
changing structures that are causing poverty. Wiktorowicz notes that from a 
sociopsychological perspective, the emergence of Islamic activism has been explained as 
protest over elitization, westernization and the failure of state-controlled economic 
policies.
112
 However, Wiktorowicz argues that social movement theory can include more 
of the complexities of Islamic movements by viewing them as actors that make strategic 
choices. This view can work to challenge the popular perception of Islamists as 
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fundamentalists whose actions are determined by ideology.
113
 One example of how social 
movement theory can be used to grasp complexities involved is Clark’s study of Islamic 
charities in Jordan, Yemen and Egypt. Clark applies social movement theory and the 
concept of horizontal ties in order to show how Islamic charities have emerged in 
response to states’ failure to provide services and social welfare to all its citizens.114 More 
than aiming for political control and spreading a religious message, Clark finds that 
charities function as a way to earn money through providing services that are not 
provided by the state.
115
 Her study of health clinics and well established charitable 
organizations shows that the most wide reaching consequence of the charities’ work is 
the strengthening of middle class networks.
116
 More than serving interests of the poor, 
members of the middle class is strengthened and empowered in terms of professionalism, 
networks, learning, work experience and other benefits that might come with 
involvement in charities. In other words, while horizontal ties are strong, vertical ties 
between different classes tend to be weak. Hence a broad involvement of local people 
volunteering to improve conditions for others does not necessarily imply a struggle that 
addresses structures and dynamics that create and maintain advantage and disadvantage. 
 
 
5.5 Summary 
 
According to Fraser, globalization has brought a need to reconceptualize struggles for 
justice. If struggles based on redistribution and recognition assume sovereign states to be 
the context in which justice is to be achieved, and without taking into consideration that 
parts of the population is not able to participate politically as citizens, then the dimension 
of political representation is missing. Transnational human rights NGOs can be viewed as 
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processes that constitute a challenge to the notion of the sovereign state as the sole 
provider for justice. However, organizations that work on social development, where the 
poor are considered objects that are to be managed or to undergo cultural change in order 
to fit with processes of modernization and economic change, can be seen to work under a 
paradigm that is undermining people’s agency. Other more grassroots oriented 
approaches to development may offer an alternative in terms of volunteerism and a 
broader mobilization of people, but in the same time carry elements of elitism and 
objectification of the targets for development. The framework presented here suggest that 
if justice is to be achieved including for the most marginalized, then processes causing 
the exclusion of some from participating as peers need to be addressed.  
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6 Findings 
 
 
In this section the data will be presented. The organizations have been divided into two 
subsections based on some of their common characteristics. The first part of each 
subsection will present findings about the organizations, which is structured under: 
structure, background and mission, how the organizations perceive themselves and each 
other, and finally aspects of distribution of resources and sustainable development. For 
the first four organizations I have included a part on outcomes of volunteering, since 
volunteers are essential to the organizations’ work and what constitute an important 
difference to the other three organizations.  
 
PART ONE 
Wattaniyya Charity, Baraka, Tunisian Committee for Coordination of Charity 
(TCCC) and Hope for Tomorrow 
 
 
6.1 Structure, background and mission 
 
What is most distinctive about these organizations is that they are all carrying out charity 
during Muslim holidays; all four organizations are organizing campaigns in the time of 
Ramadan and Eid al-Adha to the benefit of poor people. This is mainly about distributing 
food or sweets to families that reside in marginalized areas around Tunisia, and who the 
organizations consider too poor to be able to provide themselves with food for the 
holiday. Moreover, all the organizations are covering some or all of these activities:  
 food distribution 
 renovation of houses and schools  
 digging of wells for water supply 
 material and financial support to orphans  
 distribution of school material to children 
 provision of technical equipment to farmers and fishermen 
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These four organizations were all established in 2011, after the departure of the old 
regime. Since then they have established offices in Tunis with employees and are now 
working with local partners that contribute to localizing needs for charity and 
development in the central and southern regions of the country. The regions they operate 
in include some of Tunis’ suburban areas as well as Medeneen, Gafsa, Gabes, Sousse, 
Babel, Sidi Bouzzid, Zawwan, Jandouba, Tatouine and Kasserine. Per October 2013 
Hope for Tomorrow was the only one of these that limited its work to Tunis, but also this 
organization aimed to expand to other areas as they grow bigger. When it comes to 
finance, the common method is that they receive suggestions for projects by individuals 
or other organizations. After a study of conditions in the relevant area a project is 
implemented with the help of volunteers. While Hope for Tomorrow appeared to be 
completely run by volunteers, also with regards to administration and activities in the 
center, all the other organizations apply local volunteers to carry out their charitable 
activities on the ground. 
 
 
6.2 “The smile on their faces”: Outcomes of volunteering  
 
During the second interview with Wattaniyya Charity, three female assistants in the 
Tunis-office explained that they had been volunteers with the organization before they 
were employed. However, they still continue to do voluntary work. Siba explained how 
she started to work for Wattaniyya Charity: 
I was a volunteer before I was employed. I’m actually an English teacher; my 
education is English civilization and literature. But the job market for teachers is 
very tough, so I couldn’t find a job. So I work here. I love children –that’s why I 
joined the association; to see the smile on their faces. We are giving money to 
orphans, helping children in that way. […] Before the revolution we didn’t know 
about poverty in Tunisia. Now it’s important to find ways to help them to be a 
part of society. We want to give them a different life, to integrate them. 
Wedad, the fundraising office assistant explained her motivation for volunteering like 
this:  
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The first project I joined one year ago, when I saw the smile of the 
children…Especially in rural places, the smile of the children is amazing. Like 
when we distribute schoolbags, because many children cannot go to school. Their 
situation is so bad. 
Rana, another program assistant said about her volunteering experience: “Volunteering is 
a good experience. You become more responsible through helping needy people.” 
Responsibility was also emphasized by a volunteer in Hope for Tomorrow. Maryam, a 
master student in physics explained what motivates her to spend four hours per week to 
teach children mathematics:  
For me, personally, I like educating children. And in the same time I am studying. 
I will become a teacher in two years, so I need the experience. And I give them 
help; because they are in a difficult situation and they need someone helping 
them. Education in Tunisia is not so... 
On request she elaborated on why volunteering is important for her: 
And it’s important to participate in associations. It builds a personality; it helps in 
communication. So it’s important to participate in associations. For me, it has 
given me the skill to communicate with others. Before I was quite shy, but now I 
communicate with others. I have become more open, more outgoing. So it’s 
beneficial both for me and for the children. 
These volunteers expressed that networking, working experience and personal 
development along with a desire to help others were important motivations for 
volunteering. The fact that one of the volunteers did not know about poverty prior to the 
uprising shows that she is not from a marginalized area herself. On a travel to Medeneen 
in the South I met with volunteers from Wattaniyya Charity that were packing and 
distributing meat to poor families in and around the city on the day of Eid. The five out of 
about fifteen volunteers I talked to answered short and concisely on the question of why 
they were spending Eid volunteering: “To do good.” Some of the volunteers explained 
that they were spending time on volunteering because they were unemployed. At least 
one of them received a piece of meat through the same campaign, which was sponsored 
by Human Appeal and Islamic Relief. Siba at the Tunis office confirmed that many of the 
organization’s volunteers are unemployed. She estimated the number of volunteers on a 
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national basis to be about 600, whereof about 90% are unemployed. Siba also 
emphasized the good relation to the other volunteers as important for her: “We are like a 
big family, a good team. We have dinners together and sometimes we travel together. We 
are more than friends, we are like a family.”  
 
 
6.3 Religious and political affiliation 
 
Throughout the different interviews it appeared important for the representatives to stress 
that their organizations are not political, and that they are not affiliated with any political 
party. The director of Tunisian Coordination Committee for Charity (TCCC) said in her 
presentation that the organization set as a demand that all its partners should be legal, and 
that no “extremist organizations” were allowed to join their network. On the question of 
what they see as their values, none of the organizations used the term “Islamic” or 
“religious” about themselves, and none referred to religion throughout the interviews. 
Still, a look into their appearance in social media brings to view frequent references to 
Islam through posts and pictures with religious texts, Quran citations and reference to 
Islamic ethics. Hope for Tomorrow refers to its work as kefala, which is an Islamic 
charitable concept. In an interview with the director of Wattaniyya Charity, one of my 
questions was formulated in such a way that it suggested that the organization was 
Islamic, to what the director responded by saying; “We are not Islamic. We are not 
political. I hate politics; I have never wanted to get into that. We are humanitarian, 
politics is not our field.” In the same response he emphasized that they have worked 
together with UNHCR on humanitarian issues. (I got a sense that my use of the term 
annoyed him, and in the future I tried not to apply the term Islamic in interviews.) On the 
question of their relation to Qatar Charity, the director of Wattaniyya Charity said that 
they are partners, but that he would rather not see public attention around this partnership 
because Qatar is negatively perceived by many Tunisians. The director of Baraka also 
stressed that the organization is not political. When asked if Baraka is connected to Al-
Nahdha, the director replied:  
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One must separate between politics and humanitarian work. The association is not 
affiliated with a party. The poor areas have social needs, and this is not political 
affiliation. The association has nothing to hide. The question one must ask is: 
‘Who is benefiting from the help?’ and evaluate on basis of objective studies of 
real needs. Listen to us instead of what others are saying about us. What is 
important is who is benefiting, not who is funding. 
None of the organizations mentioned zakat as a method of raising funds, but all receive 
money from individuals and organizations in Tunisia and abroad. Wattaniyya Charity and 
Baraka use Zeitouna Bank, a Zeitouna mosque-university affiliated bank which provides 
Islamic finance services in accordance with shariah. 
 
 
6.4 Cooperation based on shared values 
 
All the organizations said that they are cooperating with other organizations that share 
their values. Through the interviews and reading of information material it became clear 
that they are all affiliated with each other, except Hope for Tomorrow. Members of the 
organization said that they operate with a database that holds information about their 
projects and receivers, but they did not elaborate on which organizations they share this 
database with. Although it remains unclear if it is the same database, volunteers with 
Wattaniyya Charity also referred to such a system which provided information about 
which projects receivers were benefiting from. Wattaniyya Charity and Baraka both have 
a partnership with Qatar Charity which means they are involved in many of the same 
projects. During the interview with TCCC it appeared that this organization’s president 
was the same as for Baraka. When asked if there is a difference between Baraka and 
European-funded NGOs working with social development in poor areas, Baraka’s 
director replied that their purpose and vision are the same, but their ways might be 
different. She exemplified this with the Eid-campaign, through which Baraka provides 
poor families with food and other necessities. None of the organizations in this section 
mentioned human rights and gender equality as guidelines for their work, whether 
through the interviews or in their information material. Answering the question of 
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whether they have a gender aspect in their work, such as empowerment of women, 
volunteers of Hope for Tomorrow did not know the meaning of gender and the word was 
translated to the Arabic “jins”, or sex. They answered that everyone is equal in their 
organization, and that they do not make any difference between boys and girls – although 
boys tends to be more demanding at a certain age. Hope for Tomorrow, Wattaniyya 
Charity, Baraka, and TCCC mentioned the family as important. On the question of 
whether they have gender specific projects, like helping women to establish small 
businesses, Siba replied that Wattaniyya Charity does nothing like that. The organization 
aims to help everyone, the whole family and not specifically women. She remarked: “But 
all associations have their own way, it’s ok, it’s good that others are also trying to help.” 
Baraka’s director also explained that they focus on the family, which they try to empower 
through access to water, education and income. The integrity of the family was 
emphasized by the director as important. In comparison, the director of TCCC held the 
view that empowerment of women is important, but that it is better left to local 
organizations. When asked specifically on how she viewed the approach of European-
funded organizations on this, she stressed the importance of cultural sensitiveness, and 
exemplified this with their strategy of helping women to generate income in their own 
home instead of challenging existing cultural conditions in conservative areas: 
 Tunisian associations that are funded by Europe often work on specific issues, 
and that’s probably why they get money. Women on the countryside are not so 
attractive for them and they don’t know how to work there. They must be 
empowered, but with respect for local mentality. That means that the best is to 
empower women inside their house. Europeans are not so sensitive to these 
issues. 
On the question of what differentiates Baraka from European NGOs, she answered:  
You cannot compare. European NGOs are so structured, and they operate within a 
complex legal system. In Tunisia, we do not yet have the same experience; the 
associations are only two-three years old. The differences can be illustrated by a 
new law, which is only benefiting profitable organizations. In practice 
associations are still working under the old legislative system. […] However, 
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associations made a lot of changes in only two-three years, and will continue to 
grow stronger. 
When asked if she agreed that European NGOs might contribute to the secular-Islamist 
division when choosing their partners, she rejected the idea of the division itself, and said 
this point is made bigger than it really is. Also, she said that such divisions are certainly 
not linked to political parties. In her view freedom of expression and the right to choose 
is a natural consequence of democracy and will necessarily result in different choices.  
 
6.5      Charity and social change 
According to the director of Baraka, this organization has evolved from a charity which 
only donated resources for schools and children and carried out humanitarian help after 
disasters, into social development. The director mentioned the importance of helping 
people to gain access to the market and thus improve people’s incomes and create 
sustainability.
117
 She exemplified this with their aim to create stable resources of income 
and that they support students financially. One main function of TCCC is to build 
capacities of local organizations in order to build a strong civil society. This was 
exemplified by the director as arranging trainings for volunteers of their partner 
organizations and the strengthening of traditional handicraft and textile industry as well 
as facilitation of export through European organizations. In addition they support projects 
that develop water sanitation and create jobs locally. Although smaller than the other 
organizations, Hope for Tomorrow is managing several projects in their neighborhood in 
Tunis. The center functions as  a local resource center for orphans and their families and 
is responsible for recruiting what they call foster parents who donate money for one child 
and her/his family on a yearly basis. Education is the main focus of the center, and 
volunteers are arranging support classes in languages and sciences for children and youth 
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from 6 to 20. The aim is to help disadvantaged children out of poverty and into a better 
environment than the neighborhoods in which they live. In addition the center organizes 
activities for children such as trips, and they provide health care. The center also takes on 
responsibility to renovate houses in the neighborhood and they give financial help to 
families to establish small businesses in order for them to support themselves. A priority 
group for such assistance is widows with children. While talking to a mother of three who 
was recently widowed, she explained that she always had wanted to work, but never had 
the skills or opportunity. Now Hope for Tomorrow had provided for the renovation of her 
house, including the establishment of a small store in her front yard where she will sell 
groceries. The woman said she received no help from her neighbors, who had become 
jealous of her after she received help from the organization. However, in her own words, 
she was thankful that she now was pushed to work.  
 
PART TWO 
Center for Gender in Development (CGD), Association for Social Inclusion in 
Tunisia (ASIT) and Creating the Future 
 
 
6.6 Structure, background and mission 
 
Association for Social Inclusion in Tunisia (ASIT) and Center for Gender in 
Development (CGD) are the only organizations in this study that were initiated in Tunisia 
before the 2011 uprising, in 2006 and 1993 respectively. ASIT first existed from 1995 as 
an NGO with a mission to promote professional business relations between Tunisia and 
the USA, and it later changed into focusing more on social development. After 2011 it 
has expanded its work to include poverty reduction, unemployment, women’s rights, 
democracy and strengthening of civil society. The CGD is a research and training center 
that aims to make links between research and the field through providing local 
organizations with training as part of capacity building. The organization builds 
capacities of researchers, policy makers and journalists, and in addition they work 
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directly with local organizations on poverty reduction. Creating the Future works on 
providing technical and financial support to organizations, mainly functioning as a donor 
for smaller organizations working on democracy, human rights and good governance. 
Part of their work is to provide funds for women that are accepted into ASIT’s training 
programs on entrepreneurship. The NGOs have in common that human rights, and in 
specific women’s rights are central to their work, and they all choose partners that follow 
these principles. All three organizations cooperate with or receive funds from different 
UN bodies, the World Bank and European and US governmental institutions. Broadly the 
organizations’ work on social development is identified to be centered on these issues: 
 helping women to establish small businesses 
 establishing contact with business partners abroad 
 training in business management  
One of the project coordinators of CGD explained that the center targets and supports 
more than 300 organizations in the northern, southern and middle part of Tunisia. He 
explained the criteria that are set for their partners:  
When we launch our project we say that we have to work with associations 
working on the terms of political participation, democracy, citizenship, human 
rights and of course gender equality. 
ASIT main office is situated in a seemingly impoverished neighborhood in Tunis. The 
office holds about five employees and as of October 2013 also two American students 
who were doing their internships with the organization. When the topic of Islamic 
organizations and volunteering was brought up by the interviewer, the president of ASIT 
explained why the organization is not able to recruit volunteers in the same way as 
charities: 
For the Islamic…you know…it’s about giving to the others, and all these nice, 
religious feelings about giving. It could be attractive. If I wanted to attract 
volunteers I would do the same. But my work is different. I’m not here to promote 
awareness about cancer or the issue of violence against women. Because THEN 
you find. Then people come. […] But here I’m looking for those who are coming 
to help the NGO promote something or…about the development process, or about 
  50 
training, or about advocating. […] Our mission as an NGO, for me and for those 
who are like me, it’s another level. 
 
 
6.7 Human rights as basis for cooperation 
 
The director of CGD emphasized that their focus is on women’s rights, and that CEDAW 
is central to their work. For their partner organizations, it is a demand that they are human 
rights oriented in their work and that they accept equality between men and women. The 
director explained that she has nothing against working with organizations that have an 
Islamic vision as long as they implement human rights in their work. She stressed that of 
the around 300 NGOs that CGD works with, all are working on human rights. At one 
point the notion of Islamic was discussed:  
All these NGOs that I am working with, it is maybe 300. They’re working with 
human rights, but that does not mean that they are not working with an Islamic 
vision. But I am not able to know if some of them are working for or against 
Islamic (sic). I don’t think that there is a lot that are working on Islamic. And 
against Islamic. Because I think that the term Islamic is a political term. And I am 
not working with parties. I am working with NGOs. 
She elaborated on the difference: 
I am not working with charities, even if they are Jews or Catholics or...I’m 
working with the institutions that say that they are working for development, the 
development NGOs. Or human rights NGOs. For me, the concept of Islamic is 
linked with charity. But, maybe after your study I will know better, because we 
don’t know a lot. Your work could be very good for us, because we don’t know a 
lot about these charity associations. 
Several times during the interview the director stressed that CGD does not work with 
charity organizations, often as a reaction when the notion of charity was brought up by 
the interviewer. The aspect of sustainability was also held up to be a marker of 
difference: 
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We are not working with charity, because charity for us is to help the very, very 
poor. The others, they have to work. They are not to be helped. They have to be 
actors and they have to be skilled. Because if you give them, they continue to be 
in need. 
During the second interview with ASIT, the issue of political division was brought up. I 
asked the project coordinator about his opinion on whether organizations like his own 
could work to bridge the gap between secularist and Islamist actors in civil society. He 
answered: 
Yes. We just received the confirmation about the first part of the funding from the 
UNDP for a project called ‘Enough’. This project is about encountering religious 
extremism. The idea of the project is that we will have debating, workshops and 
trainings. Human rights trainings and public speaking trainings. However, the 
people who are targeted will be brought together in the same group; youth, 
women and community leaders. By community leaders we mean 
preachers…imams. So we will be bringing these people together. We’re different, 
yes, but we are living in the same environment, and we have to learn to respect 
and work with each other. 
 
 
6.8 Gender equality in focus 
 
As the director pointed out, Center for CGD’s focus is on what they call sustainable 
development. One such project is about providing women in a village with equipment for 
production of olive oil, and CGD was at the time of the interview attempting to establish 
a trade between the producers and a foreign businessman. The director explained what 
such projects result in:  
And now...the women are producing oil, and in two months or one month –I don’t 
know, they are selling their oil after putting it in bottles and they will be self-
reliant. We are just pushing them. They are poor, but they are not as poor as 
before. And we try to skill them; we don’t give them any dinars.118 For me this is 
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development, but in the same time we try to empower them, because we listen to 
them, we let them speak, more and more. We expose them to others; we give 
them the opportunity to come to Tunis, to go to Jordan, to go to other areas, to 
give them some opportunities. And for us, if we have some money from donors, 
it’s for that. And it’s better to give them some opportunities to know and to learn, 
than to give them money and things through charity. 
Both the president and one of the project coordinators of ASIT also highlighted 
unemployment, women’s rights, local entrepreneurships and religious fundamentalism to 
be important issues to work on all over the country. The president of ASIT explained the 
importance of local partners in the regions where they want to work: 
So, in each region we collaborate with local NGOs. That’s how I prefer it. First, 
you are empowering them. Second, they know the people. They are introduced, 
they are trusted. They are from there. I don’t know better than them what people 
need there. How I should talk to them, and who we should select. […] Our role is 
more to look for the grants, we have the grants. The needs have to be expressed 
by the locals, and we try to…But there are common needs everywhere. 
Another project run by ASIT is about alternative tourism, which is about the construction 
of a cultural and environmental travel path in two governorates, which promotes what 
they define as green tourism and in the same time local entrepreneurship and 
development of cultural and artistic projects along the path. In this way they aim to bring 
more job opportunities in areas which are not frequently visited by tourists. In addition, 
ASIT manages programs that aim to promote women entrepreneurship: 
We did a business plan on how to create a business center for women, within the 
NGO. We train trainers within the NGO, who are themselves training the women. 
We also worked with these centers to develop their services in terms of attracting 
mentors to the women. Attracting funds to fund the projects of the women they 
are training. And also include other services like political awareness programs for 
women, or bringing a psychologist to women, if they are suffering from for 
example violence, so it becomes more a center for women, as opposed to just 
women entrepreneurship. So, this is an example of a project, which is built in 
order to move from the informal to the formal sector. For women who have a 
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micro-business, who is not registered, who does not pay taxes, who doesn’t have 
any access to social security; we help her to go through all this process, so she can 
have retirement in the end of the day.  
In addition to capacity building of NGOs, ASIT also runs smaller programs where they 
provide sewing- and literacy training for women in their main office.  
 
 
6.9 Political propaganda versus development for all 
 
When a program coordinator of CGD told me about his experiences in the field, he stated 
that the problem with Islamic organizations is that they are affiliated with political 
parties, using charity for the purpose of collective support: 
They are not making difference between persons who are real practitioners of 
Islam and other ones. So they are helping both groups. For example, if I am not an 
Islamist and I am not belonging to any Islamist political party, and if I don’t have 
a reference to religion; if I need help, they will help me also. So they are not 
choosing only, or working with only people who have a political or religious 
background. But the problem is that when they go to an area to bring help or 
assistance, they are always using religious references. For example, they are using 
texts from the Quran. Or they are taking the opportunity to be in close contact 
with the population, to talk with them about the main mandate of Islam. And also 
we receive testimonials from the population. They are saying that these persons 
are in close contact with Islamist parties for example. Because in Tunisia, in the 
small cities, everyone knows everyone. So, I know exactly what you are doing 
here for example, and I know exactly... Because they are tribal organizations. 
When asked how ASIT differs from Islamic organizations that also work on social 
development, the president explained how the Islamic generate support for political 
parties instead of bringing sustainable development:  
And sometimes they do the same things as us. We cannot do what they do in 
terms of distributing money, buying stuff for people… But they do what we do. 
They provide training and management etcetera. But the difference is that we are 
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open for everybody, they are not. They are not open for everybody. Or…people 
are not stupid anyway. But, however, they are there, and their presence does not 
prohibit us from what we are doing…what we have to do. Maybe they are 
disturbed more than they are disturbing us. But on the contrary, wherever they 
are, we should be there. […] Their role will be crucial during the elections, the 
next elections. Because what they do, they distribute the money. These are the 
arms of the Islamist party during the elections. They are everywhere, in each 
community. It’s a machine. 
According to the director of Creating the Future, all aid is political. In his view 
organizations that promote human rights are also political in the sense that they promote 
political rights. Moreover, aid can be used to pressure governments and to impose the 
agenda of one country onto another. When it comes to Creating the Future’s work they 
attempt to be neutral in the sense of not giving money to political parties: 
We do now in our more than 30 projects have people who have political 
affiliation with Islamists, or Al-Nahdha, but that’s their personal belief. We have 
people who are of other political affiliation. The most important thing for us is to 
remain neutral. Even though we are doing a political act that is to…we are 
working on political development…is to make sure that the money that we are 
giving to organizations do not go to political parties. Whether directly; that is the 
government’s body, or indirectly; for example you are doing propaganda for 
them. So, it’s a thin line, you have to be careful. And that requires a lot of 
expertise, not to do any mistakes. However, as for the national organizations, I 
think it’s a mistake not to say that they are political. When you open the first page 
of the Tunisian law of associations, you have one of the first paragraphs that says: 
‘national associations have the right to express their political opinions.’ So the 
law…the legislation is giving them the right to…but they say: ‘no thanks we 
don’t need it.’ So…It’s not very wise, especially since no one is apolitical. And, 
based on my own experience, people who say they are non-political are most 
probably the most politically biased people that you will come across. 
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When I brought up the possibility that some organizations, for instance Qatar Charity 
might also work on social development, his reaction was that such a shift in focus most 
likely has to do more with a strategic improvement of its public image in Tunisia: 
Maybe not everything is true, but there are enough things being said, whether they 
are true or not, to make it impossible for people who show the Qatari colors. Once 
these colors are shown it will be difficult. But not everywhere. That’s why I think 
the money goes not exclusively to Islamist charities. 
According to the views presented here, charities have a political function as they generate 
support for Islamist parties. If charities are working on more sustainable projects this is 
probably a strategy for taking focus away from religious propaganda. While promotion of 
human rights may be considered political in terms of advancement of political rights, they 
serve the interest of all, as compared to charities that only serve the interests of political 
parties.  
 
 
6.10 Summary 
 
The organizations presented here have been categorized on background of how they 
present their work on social development in marginalized communities. It appears that 
the four organizations in the first section are in the process of moving from a 
humanitarian, charity based focus to more long term development like building 
infrastructure, schools and small scale entrepreneurships. They still have a charity aspect 
which can be observed in campaigns during religious holidays and their explicit 
references to religious values in their information material. However, none of them 
framed their work as political campaigning during the interviews, and they all claimed 
that they were not affiliated with any political party. The volunteers I spoke to appeared 
to be motivated by personal gains like working experience and people’s gratitude more 
than politics. The three last organizations on the other hand, expressed strong concerns 
that charities are serving Islamist political parties and therefore their work is not 
compatible with their own projects, and they perceive themselves as more inclusive in 
terms of having women’s rights as basis for social development. Although separated in 
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categories here, there appears to be similarities in the way that some of the organizations 
operate in terms of training and support for entrepreneurs. Still, charities are met with 
suspicion about political bias and affiliated with Islamism, and should be countered with 
efforts in the advancement of women’s rights.  
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7 Analysis 
 
 
This section will provide an analysis of the findings based on literature and the theoretical 
framework presented in previous sections. Fraser’s notions of recognition, distribution 
and representation will serve as a starting point for a discussion on how the organizations 
frame their work. The discussion will then focus on the political dimension; on who is 
included and excluded in the organizations and how this can be explained in terms of 
NGOization and objectification. Later we will see how discourses on development that 
are based on oppositional binaries and stereotypes might contribute to alienation and the 
lack of awareness of how other actors in development operate within the field of social 
development.  
 
 
 
7.1 Redistribution and recognition 
 
The organizations that constitute this study all have projects that focus on bringing 
change on a grassroots level, whether it is based on distributing materials and services or 
aiming to train women in their rights and equip them to support themselves. CGD, ASIT 
and Creating the Future all base their work on women’s rights, meaning that their partner 
organizations need to implement the principle of gender equality in their work. By 
applying Fraser’s three dimensions of justice, CGD, ASIT and Creating the Future can be 
said to center their work on recognition.
119
 This implies that women suffering from 
poverty are the most vulnerable in society and they need assistance in bettering their 
situation and to know their rights. As in the example given by CGD’s director, one 
project literally raised some women from the ground through providing them with 
resources that enabled them to refine their herbs into oils that could be exported. As it 
appears from the outside, the women were given dignity and their financial situation was 
improved. CGD and ASIT also give support to small women-run businesses, and they 
arrange trainings for individuals and organizations in how to run a business, in 
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networking for business women, in language training and in how to participate in 
elections. Capacity building and training of individuals coincide with the categories that 
Tadros labels “power to” and “power in”, which are the sort of empowerment projects 
that most commonly receive donor support in the MENA region.
120
 These methods are 
not based on mass political action, rather in people’s needs for power and the ways to 
obtain it defined by the organizations. Again, with reference to Fraser, it is possible to 
apply the concept of redistribution to interpret these strategies for poverty reduction, 
since supporting communities with resources necessary for business establishment is part 
of what the organizations do.
121
 As has been pointed out earlier, what is most distinctive 
about Wattaniyya Charity, Baraka, TCCC and Hope for Tomorrow is that part of their 
focus is on distribution of material goods and in some cases money. Applying Fraser’s 
categories of justice, their actions of charity can be understood as centered on 
redistribution, or having an economic character. As the findings show, all the charities 
have taken a turn towards social development, applying terms such as “empowerment”, 
“development”, “sustainability” and “capacity building” to describe their will to create 
jobs locally and to support local economies.  
 
 
7.2 Inclusion and exclusion: managing the poor 
 
In spite of differences in how the organizations present themselves, there are similarities 
especially with regards to organizational structure and aspects of what Choudry and 
Kapoor describe as NGOization.
122
 It can be argued that elitization may be a consequence 
when local initiatives form a base of professionals that design projects in accordance with 
donors’ policies. What Tadros, Jad, Choudry and Kapoor have suggested is a backside of 
the process of NGOization is the incapability to mobilize masses of people.
123
 According 
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to Tadros, an active promotion of social mobilization and the building of alliances and 
coalitions is what constitute a challenge to division of power, which could be translated 
into Fraser’s dimension of political representation.124 The organizations in this study 
appear to operate with a development discourse that view the poor as objects that are to 
be studied, helped and managed in accordance with what Escobar has described.
125
 Even 
the organizations with a charity profile that have large bases of volunteers could be 
argued to operate with clear distinctions between the poor and the organization. Personal 
benefits such as professional experience and networks suggest what Clark views as 
horizontal ties rather than including the poor as peers.
126
 The way the volunteers spoke 
about their involvement in terms of “us” and “the poor” indicates a distinct separation 
between givers and receivers. As has been pointed out, three of the NGOs did not base 
their work on volunteers. The director of ASIT stressed that even if they wanted they 
probably would not have been able to recruit people working for free because the nature 
of their work is of a different nature – more suitable for professionals than volunteers 
driven by what she called “nice religious feelings.”  
 
So far we have seen that strategies that aim to make people economically independent 
through buying them equipment, training them in developing their own business, or 
providing education and language training in marginalized areas can be explained in 
terms of recognition and redistribution. However, as long as the projects do not go further 
and the organizations claim to represent the poor instead of supporting grassroots 
movements that aim for structural change, the political dimension is missing. Moreover, 
with regards to what Choudry and Kapoor claim to be effects of NGOization, such as the 
promotion of exclusion rather than inclusion, networking among elites nationally and 
internationally and professionalization of struggles is not indicative of an integrated 
struggle against maldistribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation. A consequence 
might rather be a strengthening of groups that are already well represented in the political 
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community in which they operate.
127
 In order to discover some of the challenges involved 
for all organizations working on social development in Tunisia, one should consider that 
they are operating within a state that can be aligned to what Fraser and Trouillot have 
formulated as the peripheral state’s lack of ability to protect citizens from exploitation 
due to changes in the global economy and provide economic justice in terms of 
welfare.
128
 Although the organizations frame their work in a way that view poor people 
as objects rather than including them as peers, projects that involve training and 
participation in classes might bring new opportunities for people to meet. The outcomes 
in terms of networking and building of movements as bi-effects of a specific project 
could be explored through ethnography. 
 
 
7.3 Empowerment without recognition 
 
Although representatives for CGD, ASIT and Creating the Future had specific ideas 
about charity and religious content in what was discussed during the interviews as 
Islamic organizations, I would argue that in fact some of the organizations work in ways 
that are quite similar in spite of framing their work differently. This can be observed in 
projects that aim to support small businesses and informal training. Although the other 
four organizations do not explicitly focus their projects on women, Baraka and TCCC do 
run projects attempting to empower women, but without challenging norms in their local 
communities. While Hope for Tomorrow explicitly denied having a gender focus in their 
work, it turned out that women are a prioritized group when it comes to psychological 
and material support for establishment of small groceries in the neighborhood. Even if the 
organizations do not have an explicit strategy for empowerment of women, we could 
name these approaches as what Tadros defines as “power to” and “power within.”129  
Several of the organizations claimed that their aim was not to challenge norms in the 
societies they work in. If their function is primarily to fill gaps in social services, or what 
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Trouillot describes as producing state effects in peripheral areas of Tunisia, then cultural 
adaptation seems to be more appropriate than rights-based development challenging 
norms.
130
 Although they do fit in Wiktorowicz’s definition of Islamic movements as 
mobilizing support for Muslim causes, particularly “collective action rooted in Islamic 
symbols and identities”, they claim to make no distinction between people based on 
religion.
131
 Wattaniyya Charity, Baraka and TCCC also emerged in a context of crisis, in 
the aftermath of the uprising and with large numbers of refugees from Libya. Having 
emerged from the most marginalized areas of the South, where they continue to operate, 
they frame their projects in terms of zakat, kefala, as well as being involved in organizing 
Quran classes. Such framing and activities might as well be viewed as appropriate 
strategies to communities where many people are religiously conservative. While the 
definition as Islamic social movements may be useful to discuss the heterogeneity of 
movements that implement religion in their projects, it appears less useful with regards to 
organizational structure and the discourse of development observed among the 
participants in this study. Wattaniyya Charity, Baraka, TCCC and Hope for Tomorrow all 
claimed to have taken a shift from charity to development. Rather than defining 
themselves as in opposition to organizations that frame their work differently, they were 
open for partnership with what was in the interviews referred to as Western 
organizations. Here development discourse is coexisting with a religious discourse 
mostly apparent on their websites, but also in charitable acts of giving on Muslim 
holidays. This corresponds with what Ibrahim has found as a general trend when she 
argues that there has been a change in Arab philanthropy from traditional charity towards 
development with potential for social change.
132
 To this could be added what Juul 
Petersen has pointed out – that although organizations apply religious symbols in their 
work, it does not necessarily mean that there is something extraordinarily Islamic or 
ideological about them.
133
 Production of rights and empowerment could be further 
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explored ethnographically and analyzed in terms of what Abu-Lughod calls the social 
worlds in which they operate.
134
 
 
 
7.4 Markers of difference 
 
The interviews with CGD, ASIT and Creating the Future gave clear indications that they 
do not see organizations like Wattaniyya Charity, Baraka, TCCC and Hope for 
Tomorrow as much more than tools for Al-Nahdha, and therefore working against 
women’s rights and empowerment of women. At the same time, Jones and Juul Petersen 
have found a turn in development literature towards partnerships with what is defined as 
FBOs. Such organizations are viewed as opportunities to advance human rights in the 
areas the operate in.
135
 However, this approach, which Jones, Juul Petersen and Tadros 
have described as instrumentalization of religion, is not the same as challenging dualistic 
thinking about secularism and Islamism.
136
 A challenge to dualistic thinking in the 
Tunisian context, one could argue, would include addressing historical divisions 
promoted by state secularism, including the governmentalization of women’s rights and 
suppression of religious expressions. Rather than interpreting secularism and women’s 
rights as something universal and as a given, as something that exists in opposition to all 
forms of political Islam (or what is perceived as such), construction of these concepts 
should be interpreted in terms of historical and contemporary construction of discourses 
that surround them. More specifically the concept of women’s rights has been used in 
order to strengthen past regimes rather than addressing the spectrum of limitations for 
women (and men), such as unemployment, landlessness and the problem that the poorest 
remain poor. As Kandiyoti has pointed out, the governmentalization of women’s rights 
might contribute to the rise of conservative ideologies.
137
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In this case study, whether or not charity and development generate support for 
conservative movements or parties, what we see is that there is a process of alienation. 
During interviews with CGD, ASIT and Creating the Future the mention of charity with 
religious references, volunteering and a connection to Qatar turned out to be perceived as 
synonymous with Islamism and thus perceived as in opposition to these organizations. 
Here appears an idea that empowerment, women’s rights and (sustainable) development 
are markers of difference, functioning to categorize oneself in opposition to others that 
are conservative, politically biased and only use development as a means for promoting 
ideology rather than contributing to better conditions for the poor in the longer term. 
What seems to be lost in this process of framing and identification, where women are a 
central marker of difference, is the ability to discover other processes of empowerment 
and meanings of women’s rights. In this sense, a function of what Cornwall has defined 
as buzzwords may be to create and maintain differences between actors in development 
as well as covering up processes of inclusion and exclusion with regards to organizations 
and the communities they operate in.
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8 Conclusion 
 
This paper has explored how seven different organizations work on social development in 
Tunisia. It has highlighted some of their characteristics and the ways they frame their 
work, which have made it possible to divide them into two groups. Four of the 
organizations; Wattaniyya Charity, Baraka, TCCC and Hope for Tomorrow are found to 
center their work on redistribution, which can be observed in actions of charity. CGD, 
ASIT, and Creating the Future all strongly emphasize that they are not performing 
charitable work and hold up women’s rights as the core of what they do. I have found that 
although they have an aspect of redistribution, their framing can best be described in 
terms of recognition. The first four organizations have undergone a shift from charity to 
social change through activities such as education, business support, as well as benefits 
for volunteers involved in terms of networks and professional training. Several of them 
also appeared to have projects directed towards women, although without framing these 
projects with a language of women’s rights or as attempts towards gender equality. 
Although some projects might be quite similar to each other in content, the framings 
remain different; something which is most obvious in terms of women’s rights. We have 
seen that the organizations are not addressing political and economic structures that 
contribute to poverty, formation of elites and objectification of the poor. Social and 
political divisions have been produced through history and continue to be part of the 
context in which the organizations operate. This study has outlined some challenges in 
the way that the organizations frame their work with regards to divisions and inequalities. 
It has been suggested that if these issues are not addressed by the organizations 
themselves, there is a risk that they contribute to processes of social and political 
exclusion rather than inclusion on a community level as well as in the larger society in 
which they operate in.   
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